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Abstract
For the military, effective human-agent teaming
requires a shared understanding between the human
and the intelligent agents acting on their behalf. One
of the central challenges associated with developing
this shared understanding originates at the information
level. The simple fact is while all information may be
created equal, the value of information is not.
Confounding this calculation is the knowledge that the
true value of information is dependent not only on its
source, content and latency, but just as importantly on
the context of the situation in which it is being
exercised. Building upon previous research aimed at
codifying the value of information, this paper presents
a multi-facetted experiment meant to discern a
Soldier’s value of information within varying military
contexts. Initial results reveal that context plays a
significant role in how information is valued and more
importantly provides a foundation for strengthening
human-agent
information
understanding
and
collaboration.

1. Introduction
Modern military operations are framed by a myriad
of information sources that provide an unprecedented
volume, velocity, and variety of information not found
in most other domains. While on the surface it would
seem that the more information the better, the fact is
having too much information increases cognitive work
load and potentially results in overlooking information
that is relevant to the current situation [1, 2]. Required
is a process for foraging and transforming large
amounts of heterogeneous data from multiple sources
into useful situational understanding, that in turn would
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accelerate and improve the decision making process
[3]. A key feature of such a process would be a method
for judging the importance of pieces of information.
The Value of Information (VoI) metric is such a
feature [4, 5].
The task of determining which information is
valuable is a difficult process. To assist in combating
this challenge, the U.S. Army Research Laboratory
(ARL) has established Human-Agent Teaming (HAT)
as one of its essential research areas (ERA). The HAT
ERA is focused on leveraging the strengths of both the
human and intelligent agents to improve overall
operational performance [6]. Thus, teams of humans
and intelligent agents are performing military-relevant
tasks more efficiently and effectively than either group
does alone. One of the goals of this initiative, and the
subject of this research, is context-based information
sharing to efficiently provide the information each
Soldier/Agent needs; sharing concepts, intentions, and
situations while not overburdening the systems.
With that goal in mind, this paper presents the
initial steps to understanding context-based
information sharing with an experiment designed to
discern the role context plays in the value of
information. The experiment builds upon previous
research that successfully captured and codified how
analysts perceive the value of information (VoI) given
its source, content, and latency [7, 8, 9]. The remainder
of the paper is organized into the following 4 sections.
Section 2 presents background on the military
challenge, VoI determination, and the state of the
current prototype. In Section 3, the VoI Context Study
is presented followed by a look at some early results
and analysis in Section 4. Concluding remarks and
future directions are given in Section 5.
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2. Background
2.1. Understanding the Domain Challenge
Commander’s intent is a salient characteristic in the
military decision making process and dependent on
developing accurate situational awareness and
understanding [10]. Situational Awareness (SA) is
formally defined as a person’s “perception of the
elements in the environment within a volume of time
and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the
projection of their status in the near future” [11].
While having good SA generally indicates knowledge
of “what” is occurring, having good situational
understanding (SU) leads us to recognize the “why”
and potential consequences in the decision space.
Relevant information is the key to developing the SU
and ultimately making the correct decision.
Today’s military operations utilize information
from a myriad of sources that provide overwhelming
amounts of data. Shown in Table 1 are the range of
reports received at each military echelon and the
timescale to plan and execute a mission. While the
times are notional, the general policy for military
planning is that one-third of the available time be used
for planning at any echelon, leaving two-thirds of the
time for planning at lower echelons. The execution
times represent the notational time durations needed to
carry out a typical mission at that echelon [12].
Needless to say, accurate and timely VoI estimations
are essential to the information analysis process and
integral to battlefield success. Long-term, human-agent
teaming is envisioned as critical to supporting this
process with intelligent information foraging and
transformation agents capable of acting in concert with
the context of the current operation and overall mission
goal.
Table 1. Typical Range of Information and
Executing Times [12]
Echelon

Reports
per hour

Division
Brigade

~Millions
170K

Battalion

56K

Company
Platoon

18K
6K

Plannin
g
Time
Week
Days
Days
/hours
Hours
Hour

Execution
Time
Week/ Days
Days
Day
Hours
Hour/Min

2.2. Value of Information Determination
Assigning a VoI assessment to an information
element is a multiple step process requiring

intelligence collectors and analysts to judge the
information’s value within a host of differing
operational situations. For the military, this process is
abstractly defined within two documents: the annex to
NATO STANAG (Standard Agreement) 2022 along
with Appendix B of US Army FM-2-22.3 [13, 14].
This guidance provides two tables for judging the
“reliability” and “content” of a piece of data, with each
characteristic broken into six categories. Reliability
relates to the information source, and is ranked from A
to F (reliable, usually reliable, fairly reliable, not
usually reliable, unreliable, and cannot judge).
Information content is ranked from 1 to 6 (confirmed,
probably true, possibly true, doubtfully true,
improbable, and cannot judge).
While doctrinal
guidance does exist for grading an information
element, it does not provide any process for combining
these determinations into a VoI metric. Additionally,
combining only these two assessments of a piece of
information falls far short of representing all of the
critical aspects that determine ‘relevant’ information.
Two other important data characteristics include
latency and mission context. Latency refers to how
long ago the piece of information was collected. In
general, the latest time of value for a piece of
information is determined by the echelon of operation.
At the Company and Platoon levels for example,
information perishability is within hours.
As a
surrogate for mission context, the original VoI research
substituted operations tempo in its place. Here,
operations tempo relates to the decision cycle for the
mission; that is, the time that can or will be used to
plan, prepare, and execute the mission. Operations
tempo is generally divided into three levels: strategic,
operational and tactical. On the operations tempo
spectrum, strategic operations generally have decision
cycles measured in months or longer. Tactical
operations, on the other hand, measure their decision
cycle in minutes to hours, with operational level lying
somewhere between.

2.3. Current VoI Prototype
Working with analysts from the U.S. Army
Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE), a fuzzybased approach was adopted for developing a
prototype decision support system that assists with VoI
determination. Specifically, a Fuzzy Associative
Memory (FAM) model was utilized to construct the
original VoI System. A FAM is a k-dimensional table
where each dimension corresponds to one of the input
domains of the rules.
Fuzzy if-then rules are
represented within the FAM [15, 16 17]. While
numerous characteristics could be applicable to
determining the VoI, the features of source reliability
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(SR), information content (IC), timeliness, and
operations tempo were used as the starting point to
construct the original Single-Source VoI System. The
architecture of the original Single-Source VoI System
is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 1: Single-Source VoI FAM Overview
The output from the system is determined by the
standard fuzzy centroid defuzzification strategy. More
detailed descriptions of the FAMs and the series of
surveys and interviews with subject matter experts
(SMEs) that were used to codify the cognitive
requirements, collect the functional requirements, and
elicit the fuzzy rules of the single-source prototype
system can be found in [7, 18]. The current multisource information amalgamation prototype is capable
of determining the VoI for a combination of
information elements that either complement or
contradict an original element of information [19].
Limiting the current fuzzy model is the use of the
operations tempo (strategic, operational, and tactical)
as a surrogate for mission context. To be effective, an
understanding of how mission context influences the
VoI in a military environment must be undertaken.

3. VoI Context Study
Studying and ultimately modeling the role context
plays in the valuation of information in a military
environment is a daunting task. In addition to
developing scenarios with the fidelity required to
adequately define a military context, obtaining access
to the number of Soldiers required to run a study is a
near impossible task.
With the assistance of the U.S. Army Research
Institute’s Umbrella Weeks (UWs) program the
challenge of Soldier access was solved. UWs are
Department of Army sponsored events that mandate
organizations across the Army grant an annual oneweek access period to Army research agencies for the
purpose of studies involving Soldiers and facilities.
For the VoI Context Study (VCS) three UWs were
identified during fiscal year 2018: Fort Lewis during
May 2018, Fort Bragg and Fort Riley during July 2018.
During the first VCS at Fort Lewis, ARL was afforded

access to 77 Soldiers from the 7th Infantry Division
and the 393rd Expeditionary Support Command. The
Soldiers participating in this first study varied in age
from 18 to 45 years old, in experience from 8 months
to over 10 years and covered over 15 different
occupational specialties. The 3-day study was divided
into (15) 30-minute sessions, 5 sessions per day. Each
session allowed 5-7 Soldiers to participate at a time.
Each session began by defining the macro context
of the given military scenario. This critical piece of the
study was accomplished by showing and explaining the
information on Figure 3. At a high-level, the Soldiers
were told they were to assume they were assigned to a
unit deployed to an area of operations (AO) in southern
Iraq on a stability operation and one of their primary
tasks was to analyze information and make judgments
as to its value to the operation. The operation was
further refined by defining five Priority Information
Requirements (PIRs). PIRs are information that the
commander has deemed vital to his/her on-going
decision making process. Placing the Soldiers within a
defined geographical AO and giving them definite
mission objectives frames their area of interest (AI).
Combined with their particular occupational training
and experience, the AI, at a high-level of abstraction,
defines a Soldier’s military context.
With the macro context defined, the Soldiers were
then guided through a series of vignettes that defined
the micro context of the military situation. The
vignettes served as the primary independent variable
permitting manipulation of the relevancy of the
information introduced to the Soldiers that was to be
scored. Shown in Figure 4, the vignettes are divided
into three categories: High, Medium and Low.
Relevant-High vignettes contain information that is
regarded as highly mission relevant and containing PIR
information.
Relevant-Medium vignettes contain
information that might be considered mission relevant
and may or may not contain PIR information. The
Relevant-Low vignette contains information that is not
considered mission relevant. Importantly, the vignettes
included in the study were vetted by an Army SME
before the study began.
While micro context served as the primary
independent variable of the study, the second
independent variable added to each vignette was the
source reliability (SR) rating of the information given.
The SR is an evaluation as to the trustworthiness of the
information. This second variable was used to
determine the degree to which SR had on the valuing a
given context. For example, even though a given
vignette could be rated highly mission relevant, the fact
is was associated with an unreliable source could
potentially diminish its perceived value. Depicted in
Table 2 is the official military SR rating table. For the
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study, the following four SR categories were
examined: (1) fairly reliable, (2) unknown, (3) usually
reliable or (4) unreliable. This variable was held
constant during each participant’s trial.
The SR rating along with a collection of vignettes
defined an experimental Vignette Group (VG):
• Vignette Group #1 (VG-1): contained vignettes
A, B, C and D with an information source deemed
fairly reliable.
• Vignette Group #2 (VG-2): contained vignettes
A, B, C and E with an information source deemed
unknown.
• Vignette Group #3 (VG-3): contained vignettes
A, B, C and D with an information source deemed
usually reliable.
• Vignette Group #4 (VG-4): contained vignettes
A, B, C and E with an information source deemed
unreliable.
Note: Each Vignette Group contained a Relevant High
A-vignette, Relevant Medium B-vignette, Relevant
Low C-vignette, along with a fourth vignette of either
Relevant High D-vignette or Relevant Medium Evignette.

Table 2: Source Reliability Table
No doubt of authenticity,
trustworthiness, or competency; has a
history of complete reliability
Minor doubt about authenticity,
trustworthiness, or competency; has a
history of valid information most of
the time
Doubt of authenticity,
trustworthiness, or competency but
has provided valid information in the
past
Significant doubt about authenticity,
trustworthiness, or competency but
has provided valid information in the
past

A

Reliable

B

Usually
Reliable

C

Fairly
Reliable

D

Not
Usually
Reliable

E

Unreliable

Lacking in authenticity,
trustworthiness, and competency;
history of invalid information

F

Unknown

No basis exists for evaluating the
reliability of the source

Figure 2: Military Operation - Macro Context Overview
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Relevant High

Relevant Medium

Relevant Low

IED Vignette (A)

CSS Protest Vignette (B)

Outside AO Vignette (C)

Background: ‘MSR CHEVY’ has not
had an IED event in over 6 months and
was pronounced clear by a route
reconnaissance mission this AM

Background: Deep divides between
local Shia and Sunni Muslims have
existed for centuries. Areas where these
factions are in close proximity can cause
protests and violence.

Background: The boarder situation
along Syria and Turkey has always
been an area of contention between
Turkey and the Syrian Kurds. Tension
between militia groups could lead to all
out conflict.

Report: A Tactical Interrogation Report
from a fairly reliable source dated last
night mentions an expected IED
emplacement on MSR CHEVY.

ADA Vignette (D)

Report: Reports from a fairly reliable
source indicate that Sunni protests
against Shia merchants in the downtown
market area are planned and threaten to
disrupt normal patterns of life
Sentiment Vignette (E)

Background: HQ is planning an air
insertion into a remote village to search
for weapons caches. Air traffic at the
FOB is heavy with no significant threat
incident in the last 3 months.

Background: The populace within the
AO has been generally neutral toward
US presence. Friendly attacks on threats
have recently resulted in collateral
damage.

Report: A fairly reliable HUMINT
source indicates that threat forces are
planning attacks on US air assets

Report: A fairly reliable informant
reports that a local Imam is voicing antiUS sentiment and antagonistic views.

Report: COMINT from a fairly
reliable radio station reports increased
cross border engagements between
Syrian Kurds and the Turkish military.

Figure 3. Military Vignettes - Micro Context

With the macro and micro context defined, Soldiers
were first guided through a practice vignette to
acquaint them with the scoring process and allowed to
ask any questions. After that they were guided through
a randomized series of vignettes associated with one of
the predefined Vignette Groups.
Shown in Figure 5 is the Context Survey Form used
in the VoI Context Study. The survey consists of 3
measures: Mission Relevancy, PIR existence, and the
Information Value Scale. The first two measures
(Mission Relevancy and PIR Existence) served as
robustness checks and to validate the micro context
manipulations; ostensibly verifying the context
agreement. The Mission Relevance Scores will later
be used as a surrogate dependent variable and
correlated against the value scores. The third measure,
the value scale, measured the Soldier’s perceived value
of the information given the context of the macro and
micro environment. To keep it in a military vernacular,
the anchors on the value scale were chosen to represent
typical military response to new information.
During each vignette, after the background
statement was read, Soldiers were asked to mark, in no
particular order, how mission relevant the new piece of
information was, whether it addressed any of the PIRs,
and how valuable they perceived the information to be.
Each Soldier scored the four vignettes associated with
his/her VG.

Figure 4: Context Survey Form
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Table 3. VG-1 Average Scores

4. Results and Analysis
Analysis of the results reveals that context and
source reliability play a significant role in how
information is valued depending on its perceived
relevance to the current operation. More importantly,
the results provide an early understanding as to why
information is valued differently. To facilitate the
analysis presentation, each Vignette Group (the
collection of vignettes associated with its information
source rating) will be examined separately. For
completeness, a covariance analysis for each VG and
each vignette type is included.

Vignette
A (R-High)
B (R-Med)
C (R-Low)
D (R-High)

Mission
Relevancy
4.28
3.11
2.47
4.42

VoI
Score

PIR
Score

8.33
6.14

1
.38

4.8
8

.23
.95

4.1. Vignette Group #1 Results and Analysis Fairly Reliable Source
Included in VG-1 are vignettes A, B, C and D. The
SR associated with VG-1 is fairly reliable. This rating
was held constant for all the vignettes in this vignette
group.
As depicted in Table 3 and Figure 6, analysis of
VG-1 shows dramatic and distinct differences across
the primary vignettes (A, B & C). The Value of
Vignette A (Relevant-High) that dealt with the possible
appearance of an improvised explosive device scored
an average of 8.33 – meaning it fell just short of Report
at the Daily Brief on our Likert Scale rating, where the
value of Vignette C (Relevant-Low) that had to do with
a skirmish along the Syrian border (not in area of
operation) scored 4.8 – meaning it was in the Note
without action range.
In this instance, given
information with the same source reliability, the 4
point difference on the Likert Scale is significant and
shows context played a major role in valuing the new
information.
The PIR score of 1 for Vignette A indicates every
participant identified this information as meeting a
commander’s priority information requirement.
Notably, the measures between Vignettes A and D
(both Relevant High) scored almost identical across the
board.
The PIR for Vignette B and C were
significantly lower along with the Mission Relevancy
scores.
To test that the VoI scores were from different
population distributions, a Kolmogorov-Smirnoff 2Sample test was run across all the VoI scores. Figure 7
shows that with a D score of .62 and a P value of
.000004, the scores associated with Vignette A and C
are definitely not from the same distribution. And as
expected in Figure 8, we see that with a D score of .23
and P value of .53, Vignette A and D (both Relevant
High) share the same distribution characteristics.

Figure 5. Box Plot VoI Results of VG-1

Figure 6. KS comparison of VG-1 (A vs C)

Figure 7. KS comparison of VG-1 (A vs D)
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4.2. Vignette Group #2 Results and Analysis Unknown Source
Associated with the VG-2 are vignettes A, B, C and
E. The SR assigned to VG-2 is that of unknown.
Meaning, ‘no basis’ exists for evaluating the reliability
of the source. This rating was held constant for all the
vignettes in this vignette group.
Interestingly, analysis of VG-2 does not show a
dramatic or distinct difference across the vignettes. In
point of fact, analysis of Table 3 and Figure 9 reveals
Vignettes B, C and E share similar VoI scores. Where
we do see a difference is between Vignettes A
(Relevant High) and the rest of the vignettes. The
Kolmogorov-Smirnoff 2-Sample test between Vignette
A and the other VG-2 vignettes confirms this belief
with an average P score of .007 and a D score of .56.
For completeness, Figure 10 shows the KS plot for
Vignette A versus C; with B and E being similar.
Table 3. VG-2 Average Scores
VoI
Score

PIR
Score

A (R-High)

Mission
Relevancy
4.43

8.00

1

B (R-Med)

3.38

5.3

.62

C (R-Low)

2.56

4.9

.37

E (R-Med)

3.00

5

.56

Vignette

Figure 8. Box Plot VoI Results of VG-2
The question then is: with everything being equal
except for the information source – why does VG-2
differ radically from VG-1? Army SMEs explained the
possible difference this way: If you received a phone
call from an unknown source telling you there was a
bomb in the building, you have to react as if it is true;
the consequence is potentially very high. On the other
hand, if an unknown source tells you a local cleric is

happy with US presence in the area – you might more
easily dismiss it. In this case, the consequence of not
reacting immediately is far less.

Figure 9. KS comparison of VG-2 (A vs C)

4.3. Vignette Group #3 Results and Analysis Usually Reliable Source
Included in VG-3 are vignettes A, B, C and D.
Similar to VG-1, the only difference between the two
vignette groupings is the SR rating. Rather than a fairly
reliable SR rating, VG-3 utilizes a higher rated usually
reliable source rating. This SR rating was held constant
for all the vignettes in this vignette group.
Not unexpectedly, the results of VG-3 follow a
similar pattern as VG-1. As depicted in Table 4 and
Figure 11, analysis of VG-3 shows dramatic and
distinct differences across the primary vignettes (A, B
& C). Interestingly, the average VoI score associated
with Vignette A is actually a little higher (9.27 vs 8.33)
in VG-3 than that found in VG-1. SME analysis
attributed this higher scoring to the source reliability
being higher; the higher the reliability the higher the
trust. In that same vein, all the VoI Scores in VG-3
were higher than the other vignette groups; ostensibly
because of the higher information source rating.
To test that the distributions were from different
populations, a Kolmogorov-Smirnoff 2-Sample test
was run across all the VoI scores. Figures 12 and 13
respectively, reveal vignette A and C are not from the
same distribution with a D score of .67 and an
associated P-value of .0009; and vignettes A and D
share the same distribution characteristics with a D
score of .27 and an associate P value of .52.
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Table 4. VG-3 Average Scores

Vignette
A (R-High)
B (R-Med)
C (R-Low)
D (R-High)

Mission
Relevancy
4.7
3.7
2.44
4.37

VoI
Score

PIR
Score

9.27
7.33

.95
.38

5.33
8.61

.23
.83

Figure 10. Box Plot VoI Results of VG-3

4.4. Vignette Group #4 Results and Analysis Unreliable Source
Associated with VG-4 are vignettes A, B, C and E.
VG-4 has a SR rating that is unreliable; the lowest
possible information source rating. This source rating
was held constant for all the vignettes in this vignette
group.
Similar to VG-2, VG-4 reveals an interesting trend.
Analysis of Table 5 and Figure 14 reveal there is
virtually little difference in the mission relevance and
VoI scores. The only difference between the vignettes
is the PIR rating with vignette A.
Kolmogorov-Smirnoff 2-Sample tests run across
the entire set of VoI scores revealed none of the
distributions were from different populations. In the
best case, shown in Figure 15, the difference between
the Relevant-High Vignette-A and Relevant-Low
Vignette-C, was scored a D statistic of .26 a P value of
.47.
Army SME analysts attribute the consistently low
scores associated with this vignette group to the
unreliable information source. One SME used the
crying wolf analogy to describe the results …. once
someone has proven to fabricate the truth it is nearly
impossible to move beyond that point.
Table 5. VG-4 Average Scores

Vignette
A (R-High)
B (R-Med)
C (R-Low)
E (R-Med)

Mission
Relevancy
4.15
3
2.8
3.15

VoI
Score
5.8
4.78
4.78
4.42

PIR
Score
1
.42
.42
.42

Figure 11. KS comparison of VG-3 (A vs C)

Figure 12. KS comparison of VG-3 (A vs D)
Figure 13. Box Plot VoI Results of VG-4
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Evidence of the monotonic relationship between
Mission Relevance vs Information Valuation can be
seen in Figure 16 (a), (b) and (c); illustrated are the
scatter plots associated with Vignettes A, B, and C.
For each scenario a positive correlation can be seen.

Figure 14. KS comparison of VG-4 (A vs C)

4.5. Correlation Analysis of VGs and Vignette
With a goal of being able to model and test the
results of the study, one of the other outcomes of
interest was whether monotonicity existed between the
dependent (micro context) variable and the
independent (perceived information value) variable.
The general hypothesis was that the greater the
relevance to the “mission”, the higher the perceived
value of the information should be; and further, the
higher the SR rating of the information, the greater the
magnitude associated with that valuation. To test for
correlation, a Spearman's rank-order correlation
statistic was calculated between the surrogate
dependent variable Mission Relevance Score and the
Information valuation score. Shown in Tables 6 and 7
are the correlation coefficients associated with
aggregated scores for each vignette group and the
individual vignettes, respectively. In each case a
positive correlation exists between mission relevance
and the information valuation.
Table 6: Vignette Group Correlation Scores

Vignette Group
VG-1
VG-2
VG-3
VG-4

Spearman Rank
Correlation Coef.
.66
.76
.78
.59

Table 7: Vignette Type Correlation Scores

Vignette Type
A (R-High)
B (R-Med)
C (R-Low)
D (R-High)
E (R-Med)

Spearman Rank
Correlation Coef.
.59
.57
.79
.53
.61

Figure 16(a) Vignette A - Scatterplot

Figure 16(b) Vignette B - Scatterplot

Figure 16(c) Vignette C - Scatterplot

5. Conclusion / Future Direction
Development of effective human-agent teaming
requires a shared understanding between the human
and the intelligent agents acting on their behalf,
especially at the information level. With a goal of
providing effective, context-based information sharing,
this paper presents the initial steps necessary to discern
the role context plays in the value of information and
lays the foundation for modeling information valuation
in a military environment.
Analysis of the results revealed that context plays a
statistically significant role in how information is
valued depending on its perceived relevance to the
current operation. For this study, the mechanics of how
proved to be fairly intuitive – the greater the mission
relevance, the greater the perceived information value.
However, digging a little deeper, the results also
unveiled some less obvious trends and give an early
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understanding as to “why”. For example, in the cases
where the source of the information was unknown
(VG2), only in the relevant-high vignette (where the
projection of the consequence was life threatening) did
the value of the information correlate. Likewise, when
the source of the information was rated usually
unreliable, even though the mission relevance was
rated high, the information valuation did not follow the
general trend and actually treated it the same for all
four vignettes. Army SME analysts attribute the
consistently low scores associated with this vignette
group to a crying wolf analogy …. once someone has
proven to fabricate the truth it is nearly impossible to
move beyond that point.
Obviously with a topic as subjective as information
valuation much research remains to be done – from the
psychological underpinnings of confirmation bias to
effective group intelligence. That said, armed with the
insights from this study, two logical next steps are
planned. First, a human-in-the-loop validation
experiment is scheduled for the middle of fiscal year
2019 where software agents codified with improved
context-enable VoI FAMs will act to prioritize an
information foraging assignment. Second, working
with Army SMEs, the mission context concept will be
further expanded to include the information elements
of the operations order (OPORD). An OPORD is the
official military directive given in order to coordinate
execution of a specific operation.
With the advent of improved machine learning and
artificial intelligence, the realization of effective teams
of humans and intelligent agents performing militaryrelevant tasks is fast becoming a reality. In the future,
not only will the right information be delivered at the
right time, in the right form – but sharing the concepts,
intentions, understanding and beliefs will become
commonplace.

[6]
[7]

[8]

[9]

[10]

[11]

[12]
[13]

[14]
[15]

[16]

[17]

[18]

References
[1]

[2]
[3]

[4]

[5]

Anonymous, US Army Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Mission
Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, US
Army, August 2003.
Anonymous, “Quadrennial Defense Review”, U.S.
Department of Defense, January 2010.
Alberts, David S., John J. Garstka, Richard E. Hayes,
and David T.Signori. Understanding Information Age
Warfare.
Washington, DC: CCRP, 2001J. Clerk
Maxwell, A Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism, 3rd
ed., vol. 2. Oxford: Clarendon, 1892, pp.68–73.
Hammell, R.J. II, T. Hanratty, and E. Heilman,
“Capturing the Value of Information in Complex
Military Environments: A Fuzzy-based Approach”,
Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on
Fuzzy Systems 2012 (FUZZ-IEEE 2012), Brisbane,
Australia, 10-15 June 2012
Hanratty, T., Heilman, E., Richardson, J., Caylor, J., “A
Fuzzy-Logic Approach to Information Amalgamation”,

[19]

Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on
Fuzzy Systems (FUZZ-IEEE 2017), July 2017, Naples,
Italy.
Anonymous, US Army Research Laboratory Essential
Research Areas, September, 2017
Hanratty, T; Heilman, E; Dumer, J.; and Hammell II,
R.J. 2012. Knowledge Elicitation to Prototype the
Value of Information. In Proceedings of the 23rd
Midwest Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Sciences
Conference (MAICS 2012), 173-179. Cincinnati, OH.
Hanratty, T., Dumer, J., Hammell II, R.J., Miao, S., and
Tang, Z. (2014). Tuning fuzzy membership functions to
improve value of information calculations.
In
Proceedings of the 2014 North American Fuzzy
Information Processing Society Conference (NAFIPS
2014), oston, MA, 24-26 June, 2014.
Michaelis, J., Requirements for Value of Information
(VoI) calculation over mission specifications, SPIE
Next Generation Analyst, Orlando, FL., April 2017
Anonymous, US Army Field Manual (FM) 2-22.3,
Human Intelligence Collection Operations, US Army,
September 2006.
Endsley, M.R. (1995). Toward a theory of situation
awareness in dynamic systems. Human Factors: The
Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society,
37, 32-64.
James, John, “Military Data”, presentation, Network
Science Center, West Point, Oct 2010.
Anonymous, US Army Field Manual (FM) 2-22.3,
Human Intelligence Collection Operations, US Army,
September 2006.
North Atlantic Treaty Organizaiton (NATO) Standard
Agreement 2022 (Edition 8) Annex.
Zadeh, L.A. (1987). A theory of approximate reasoning.
In R. Yager, S. Orchinnikov, R. Tong, H. Nguyen
(Eds.), Fuzzy Sets and Applications (pp 367-412). New
York: John Wiley & Sons.
Yen, J. & Langari, R. (1999). Fuzzy Logic: Intelligence,
Control, and Information. Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Prentice Hall.
Liang, Y. “An Approximate Reasoning Model for
Situation and Threat Assessment”, Proceedings of the
Fourth International Conference on Fuzzy Systems and
Knowledge Discovery, pp. 246-250, November 2007
Nathavandi, S., "Trust Autonomy Between Humans and
Robots", Systems Man and Cybernetics: Systems IEEE
Transactions on, vol. 46, pp. 936-946, 2016, ISSN 21682216. January 2017
Hanratty, T., Heilman, E., Richardson, J., Caylor, J., “A
Fuzzy-Logic Approach to Information Amalgamation”,
Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on
Fuzzy Systems (FUZZ-IEEE 2017), July 2017, Naples,
Italy.

Page 511

